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Overconfidence Increases Productivity 
 
 
Abstract 
Recent studies report that productivity increases under tournament reward structures 
than under piece rate reward structures. We conduct maze-solving experiments under 
both reward structures and reveal that overconfidence is a significant factor in 
increasing productivity. Specifically, subjects exhibiting progressively higher degrees of 
overconfidence solve more mazes. This result shows a positive aspect of overconfidence, 
which usually has been examined in its negative aspect as an expectation bias. 
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1. Introduction 
There are many ways of paying rewards. Under a piece rate reward structure, the 
reward people earn depends solely on their individual productivity, whereas under a 
tournament reward structure, it depends on not only their productivity but also their 
competitors’ productivities. It is important to know how different reward structures 
affect productivity. In the field of labor economics and business, such knowledge could 
guide firms in setting employee rewards to increase profits, and in the context of 
education, it helps educators understand how to motivate children toward their best 
efforts.  
Recent studies examine the relationship between reward structures and productivity 
and report that productivity increases under the tournament structure compared with the 
piece rate structure (Gneezy et al., 2003; Freeman and Gelber, 2010; Mizutani et al., 
2009; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007).1
                                                   
1 Although Mizutani et al. (2009) and Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) do not focus on productivity, their 
experimental results demonstrate that productivity increases under the tournament structure compared 
with the piece rate structure. 
 Freeman and Gelber (2010), whose research is 
most relevant for this study, conducted maze-solving experiments and investigated the 
effects of the tournament prize structure and the disclosure of information about other 
subjects’ skills. They asked groups of six subjects to participate in two rounds of 
maze-solving problems. In Round 1, subjects were rewarded by piece rate. After the 
groups completed Round 1, researchers informed subjects in half of the groups about 
the distribution of mazes solved in Round 1 in their groups, but they withheld that 
information from subjects in the remaining half. In Round 2, subjects solved mazes 
under three different reward structures: fixed, single-prize tournament, and 
multiple-prize tournament. Using the number of mazes solved as the measure of 
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performance, they found that performance was lowest under the fixed-reward structure, 
higher under the single-prize tournament structure, and highest under the multiple-prize 
tournament structure. They also found that revealing information on performance of 
other group members affected productivity. When this information was disclosed to 
subjects who scored highly in Round 1, their subsequent performance was greater than 
when the information was withheld. In contrast, performance among subjects who 
scored low in Round 1, decreased when the information was disclosed and increased 
when it was withheld. 
Freeman and Gelber (2010) interpret their results as demonstrating the effect of 
incentives on effort. Under the multiple-prize tournament structure, all subjects have an 
incentive to increase their rewards, whereas the fixed-prize structure provides no such 
incentive. Under the single-prize structure, subjects with a high chance of winning earn 
the incentive, and those with a low chance of winning lose the incentive. 
This study examines the changes in productivity that occur when subjects receive no 
information about the distribution of competitors’ skills. We conduct maze-solving 
experiments under the piece rate and tournament reward structures and explore the 
effects of subjective expectations and overconfidence on productivity. Subjects are 
divided into groups of four individuals and are asked to anticipate their rankings within 
their groups. If we offer information about other subjects’ skills, it would act as an 
incentive; if we withhold information about other subjects’ skills, subjective 
expectations would act as the incentive. That is, if subjects regard themselves as good 
performers, they will try harder to win the tournament. If they do not regard themselves 
as good performers, they will give up the attempt to win the tournament.  
These subjective expectations are based on two factors: subjects’ actual ability and 
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their confidence levels. We refer to the latter as “overconfidence” or “underconfidence.” 
The results of Freeman and Gelber (2010) suggest that overconfidence may affect 
productivity. They report that the performance of subjects who scored low in Round 1 
increases when the information regarding other subjects’ performance is withheld. This 
may occur because subjects do not realize that their skills are less than their 
competitors’—that is, they are overconfident. Moreover, it is considered that the 
performance of subjects who scored highly in Round 1 decreases more when the 
information is withheld because they are underconfident. 
We have other grounds for concluding that overconfidence increases productivity. 
Gneezy et al. (2003) conduct maze-solving experiments and observe a gender difference 
in increases in performance from the piece rate to the tournament reward structure. In 
particular, female subjects perform better in all-female groups, whereas their 
performance does not increase in mixed-gender groups. Mizutani et al. (2009) conduct 
computational experiments and report that women become overconfident in all-female 
groups, whereas they are under-confident in mixed-gender groups. These results imply 
that overconfidence increases productivity and that a gender difference in 
overconfidence causes the gender difference in increased productivity. We test this 
hypothesis using actual overconfidence measures constructed from participants’ 
subjective estimates of their rankings within their groups and the number of mazes 
solved. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our 
experiment. Section 3 presents our results and reveals that subjective expectations and 
overconfidence affect subjects’ performance significantly. Specifically, subjects who 
expect worse rankings increase their performance more than those who expect better 
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rankings, and overconfident subjects increase their performance. This is evidence that 
overconfidence has a positive aspect, which previously has been studied mainly in its 
negative aspect as an expectation bias. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Method 
We conducted the experiment at Osaka University on October 25, November 15 and 
29, and December 6, 2009. Subjects included 132 students (67 males and 65 females) 
affiliated with Osaka University. We assigned subjects to groups of four participants and 
asked them to solve mazes. Subjects were not aware of which members were included 
in their groups, but knew their groups’ gender ratios. We organized groups according to 
five gender ratios: nine groups of four males; one group of three males and one female; 
13 groups of two males and two females; two groups of one male and three females; 
and eight groups of four females each.2
  The experiment consisted of three tasks—Task 1, Task 2, and Task 3. For Task 1, we 
rewarded subjects by piece rate; their reward of ¥100 per maze solved depended solely 
on their individual performance. Task 2 was completed under the tournament reward 
structure; only the winner in each group received a reward of ¥400 per maze solved. For 
 Our subjects’ tasks included solving as many 
mazes as possible within three minutes, and the time remaining always appeared with 
the maze on their computer screens. Subjects moved cursors from the start to the goal 
point using arrow keys on their keyboards. They could skip a maze by clicking a radio 
button on their screens and move to the next maze whenever they were willing to do so. 
The number of skips was unlimited. 
                                                   
2 We initially intended to conduct our experiments using three gender groups (all-male, all-female, and 
two males-two females). However, two additional groups (one male-three females and three males-one 
female) emerged as we recruited subjects hastily to replace those who cancelled at the last minute. 
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Task 3, subjects could choose the piece rate or tournament reward structure before 
solving mazes, and rewards were paid on the basis of their choices. To accustom 
subjects to maze-solving using a computer, we conducted one-minute training sessions 
before Task 1. 
In addition, subjects were asked to anticipate their ranking within their groups after 
completing each task. We asked them not only their expected rankings but also their 
probability distribution forecasts. In estimating the expected ranking, subjects pick a 
rank between 1 and 4. In estimating the probability distribution, subjects were required 
to give their expected probabilities of each rank by percentages. We also asked them to 
complete a questionnaire at the end of the experiment to measure their attitudes toward 
risk and competition.  
All subjects received a ¥3,000 show-up fee for participation. At the end of the 
experiment, we randomly selected one task among the three, for which we actually paid 
the reward. Subjects were paid on the basis of their performance in the tasks plus the 
show-up fee. 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Gender differences in performance 
 Table 1 reports the mean number of mazes solved and the standard errors for Tasks 1 
and 2. For both tasks, the mean number of mazes solved by males was greater than that 
by females. The gender differences in mean mazes solved are approximately 2.5 in Task 
1 and 1.9 in Task 2 and are significant at 1%. Niederle and Vesturland (2007) and 
Mizutani et al. (2009) conduct computational experiments under the piece rate and 
tournament structures and find no gender differences in performance, perhaps indicating 
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gender differences in the ability to solve mazes.3
  Table 2 presents the change in performance from Task 1 to Task 2. Both males and 
females increase their performance significantly. For male subjects, the mean 
performance increases about 0.9 (9.4%), and for female subjects, it increases about 1.5 
(18.5%). The gender difference in increase in performance, approximately 0.6 (9.1%), is 
significant at 1%. Our result is inconsistent with that of Gneezy et al. (2003), who report 
that performance of males improve under the tournament compared with that under the 
piece rate, but female performance do not. However, this result does not reject our 
hypothesis that the gender difference in overconfidence causes the gender difference in 
increased performance. This is because females were more overconfident than males in 
our experiment, as reported in 3-3. 
 
 
3.2. Expected ranking and performance 
  Table 3 demonstrates subjects’ performance in Tasks 1 and 2 and compares the 
change in performance with subjects’ expected rankings following Task 1. While nearly 
half the subjects estimated that they ranked second within their groups, only three 
subjects believed they ranked fourth. Subjects’ actual performance tends to be lower 
when their estimated ranking is lower, indicating that subjects to some extent ranked 
themselves reasonably. However, given that more than half estimated their rankings as 
above average, the result resembles that of Svenson (1981), who reports that a majority 
of subjects regarded themselves as more skillful and less risky than the average driver. 
  On the other hand, performance in Task 2 tends to increase when subjects’ expected 
rankings following completion of Task 1 were lower. That is, the increase in 
                                                   
3 Perhaps gender stereotyping produces the result. In fact, Steele and Ambady (2006) and Shih, Pittinsky, 
and Ambady (1999) report that gender stereotypes influenced performance.  
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performance of subjects who ranked themselves lower was greater than that of subjects 
who ranked themselves higher. This result differs slightly from Freeman and Gelber 
(2010), who report that the increase in performance among highly-skilled subjects is 
greater than the increase among lowly-skilled subjects, even when subjects have no 
information about other subjects’ skills. Our result may indicate that individuals never 
give up trying to win, even when they ranked themselves low. 
 
3.3. Overconfidence and performance 
  We asked subjects to estimate their rankings within their groups after each task. This 
expected ranking is based on two factors: subject’s actual ability and their confidence 
level. We refer to the latter as “overconfidence” or “underconfidence.” Many studies 
document gender differences in overconfidence.4
We define overconfidence numerically by deducting expected ranking from subject’s 
actual ranking after completing both the tasks. As a proxy for each subject’s actual 
ranking, we use his or her average ranking within the group generated by 1 million 
times random grouping. As a proxy for each subject’s expected ranking, we use both the 
mean of the expected probability distribution (Overconfidence 1) and the point forecast 
(Overconfidence 2). For both measures, a positive (negative) value implies that subjects 
are overconfident (underconfident) because their expected rankings were higher (lower) 
compared with their actual ranking.  
 
  Table 4 shows the means of the overconfidence measures and their gender differences. 
Means of overconfidence measures for all subjects are 0.266 for Overconfidence 1 and 
0.391 for Overconfidence 2. Both are significant at 1%, which implies that our subjects 
                                                   
4 Croson and Gneezy (2009) introduced many studies on the gender difference in overconfidence.  
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are generally overconfident. Furthermore, women are more overconfident than men in 
both measures. Gender differences are significant at 1% for Overconfidence 1 and at 
10% for Overconfidence 2. Previous literature reports that men are more overconfident 
than women (Barber and Odean, 2001). Mizutani et al. (2009) conduct almost the same 
experiment employing computational rather than maze-solving tasks, and they report 
that male subjects are more overconfident than female subjects. These results indicate 
that gender differences in overconfidence depend on the task assigned. 
  Figure 1 shows the means of Overconfidence 1 by the change in performance from 
Task 1 to Task 2. The horizontal and vertical axes present the change in performance 
from Task 1 to Task 2 and the degree of overconfidence, respectively. We find a positive 
correlation between the increase in performance and degree of overconfidence. Subjects 
whose performance increased are generally overconfident, as we define it here, and 
those whose performance decreased are generally underconfident. Further, greater 
increases in performance are associated with greater degrees of overconfidence. It is 
noteworthy that subjects whose performance does not change are neither overconfident 
nor underconfident. 
  Overconfidence has been studied mainly in its negative aspect as an expectation bias. 
Barber and Odean (2001) report that overconfidence increases frequency of stock 
trading, but returns decrease because of high transaction costs. Mizutani et al. (2009) 
and Niederle and Vesturland (2007) report that overconfidence leads subjects to 
overestimate their capabilities and enter competitions, which consequently decreases 
their returns. While these studies emphasize how overconfidence decreases returns, our 
experiment demonstrates that overconfidence can improve subjects’ performance, even 
if their performance does not improve sufficiently to earn or increase a reward. This is 
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evidence that overconfidence has a positive aspect.5
 
 
3.4. Gender and performance 
  Table 5 presents the change in performance from Task 1 to Task 2 by gender and 
gender grouping, although one group of three males-one female and two groups of one 
male-three females are excluded because the number of observation is few. Male 
subjects in two male-two female groups improve their performance compared with 
those in all-male groups, although the difference is not significant. The gender 
composition of groups did not affect female subjects’ performance. Women improve 
their performance from Task 1 to Task 2 irrespective of whether men belong to their 
group. This finding is inconsistent with that of Gneezy et al. (2003), suggesting that the 
effect of gender on performance may differ by country or culture. 
  Table 6 shows the means of overconfidence measures by gender and gender grouping, 
although one group of three males-one female and two groups of one male-three 
females are excluded because the number of observations is few. Male subjects tend to 
be more overconfident when grouped with females, and female subjects tend to be more 
overconfident in all-female groups. These results are consistent with those of Mizutani 
et al. (2009), although differences in overconfidence measures between groups are 
insignificant. 
  Results from Tables 5 and 6 are inconsistent with those of Gneezy et al. (2003) and 
Mizutani et al. (2009) in that differences in the changes in performance and 
overconfidence between groups are not significant. However, these results still support 
                                                   
5 Several recent studies demonstrate the positive roles of overconfidence. Galasso and Simcoe (2010) and 
Hirshleifer et al. (2010) reveal that CEO overconfidence encourages innovation. The latter also find that 
CEO overconfidence increases the firm’s profitability. Anderson and Brion (2010) reveal that 
overconfidence helps individuals gain status. 
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our hypothesis that overconfidence increases performance. Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate 
that overconfidence and performance tend to correlate positively, although the 
correlation for women is ambiguous. 
 
3.5. Regression analysis 
  We run the OLS regression to evaluate quantitatively the effect of expected rankings 
and overconfidence on increase in performance. We use the increase in performance and 
the rate of increase as dependent variables. As independent variables, we use dummy 
variables constructed by subjects’ point forecasts for Task 1 and Overconfidence 1 plus 
a female dummy and a constant term.6
  Table 7 presents the regression results. In Eq.1, the coefficient of the constant term is 
significantly positive at 1%, indicating that productivity increases under the tournament 
reward structure. This result is consistent with previous literature. The coefficient of the 
female dummy is also significantly positive at 1%, which is inconsistent with the result 
of Gneezy et al. (2003). However, as noted above, this result does not reject our 
hypothesis that the gender difference in overconfidence causes the gender difference in 
increased performance, for women are more overconfident than men in our experiment. 
 
  In Eq.2, we added Overconfidence 1 as an independent variable in Eq.1. The 
coefficient of Overconfidence 1 is significantly positive at 1%, but the coefficient of the 
female dummy is no longer significant. These results support our hypothesis that the 
gender difference in overconfidence causes gender difference in the increase in 
performance. 
                                                   
6 We use expected rankings on Task 1 rather than Task 2 because we wish to investigate how subjects’ 
expectations affect subsequent performance. To use expected rankings of Task 1 is useful in that we can 
ignore the endogeneity problem that subjects ranked themselves low because they did not perform well. 
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  In Eq.3, we added dummies for subjects’ expected rankings as independent variables 
to Eq.1. Coefficients of all dummies are positive, and dummies for second- and 
fourth-place rankings are significant at 10%. This result indicates that subjects who 
ranked themselves second and fourth improved their performance more than subjects 
who ranked themselves first. The significance of the constant term weakened compared 
with Eq.1, indicating that performance increases under the tournament reward structure 
are engendered by the incentive to earn higher rankings or greater rewards. Our results 
are consistent with that of Freeman and Gelber (2010) in suggesting that subjects try 
harder to win and elevate their performance. However, they differ from Freeman and 
Gelber (2010) in that the increase in performance of subjects who ranked themselves 
lower within their groups exceeded that of subjects who ranked themselves higher.  
  In Eq.4, we added Overconfidence 1 and the expected ranking dummies to Eq.1. 
Coefficients of the constant term and the female dummy are not significant, whereas 
coefficients are significantly positive for Overconfidence 1 and the expected ranking 
dummies. Therefore, we retain our result that the increase in performance and its gender 
difference are brought about by incentives for higher rankings or larger rewards and 
overconfidence. 
  Table 8 shows the results of OLS regressions using the rate of increase in 
performance from Task 1 to Task 2 as the dependent variable. The results robustly 
support our hypothesis. Coefficients of the expected ranking dummies and 
Overconfidence 1 are significantly positive. Subjects who ranked themselves lower tend 
to increase performance more than subjects who ranked themselves higher. Furthermore, 
the significance of the constant term and the female dummy are weakened by adding 
Overconfidence 1 and the expected ranking dummies to the regression. Our results 
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remained unchanged when we added the variance of the expected probability 
distribution, risk aversion, the number of skips in solving mazes, dummy variables for 
gender ratio, and attitudes toward competition. Our results are also retained when we 
substituted Overconfidence 2 for Overconfidence 1 as an independent variable. 
 
3.6. Learning and reward structure 
  To accustom themselves to maze-solving on a computer, subjects attended 
one-minute training sessions before Task 1. However, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that one minute was too brief for subjects to master their tasks and that the increase in 
performance from Task 1 to Task 2 indicates a learning effect. 
  To measure the effects of overconfidence and expected rankings while controlling for 
the learning effect, we run the OLS regressions after restricting the sample to subjects 
who chose the tournament reward structure for Task 3—the same reward structure as 
Task 2. Thus, we can control for both the learning effect and attitudes toward 
competition. Dependent variables are the increase in performance from Task 2 to Task 3 
and its rate of increase. Independent variables are the dummies constructed by subjects’ 
point forecasts in Task 2. We also use Overconfidence 1 as an independent variable, 
which is calculated on the basis of subjects’ performance and their expected rankings 
for Task 2. 
  Table 9 presents the results of OLS regression. In Eqs. 1 and 3, the constant terms are 
not significant, indicating we can dismiss the learning effect and the effect of the reward 
structure. On the other hand, we find the gender difference in increase in performance 
even from tournament to tournament. Although insignificant in Eq.1, the female dummy 
is significant at 10% in Eq.3. However, its significance weakens when we add 
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Overconfidence 1 and the expected ranking dummies as independent variables, 
supporting our hypothesis that the gender difference in overconfidence causes the 
gender difference in increased performance. Overconfidence remains significant for 
increased performance: its coefficient is significantly positive at 1%. Conversely, it is 
unclear whether performance of subjects, who ranked themselves lower, increases more 
than performance of subjects who ranked themselves higher. The coefficient of the 
second-rank dummy is significant at 5%, but that of the third-rank dummy is 
insignificant.7
 
 However, subjects who expected their rankings second within their 
groups increased their performance more than those who expected their rankings first. 
Accordingly, our results are robust with regard to the learning effect and subjects’ 
attitudes toward competition. 
3.7. Upper half and lower half 
  Freeman and Gelber (2010) report that subjects who ranked poorly in ability do not 
increase their performance, whereas those who ranked highly increase their 
performance when informed about the distribution of mazes solved in their group. 
Based on our finding that overconfidence increases performance, we could re-interpret 
the result of Freeman and Gelber (2010). We might conclude that overconfidence 
among lesser-performing subjects is corrected by providing them objective information 
and as a result their performance does not increase. If this is the case, lower-performing 
subjects might increase their performance when information about the distribution of 
mazes solved is withheld. 
  Table 10 presents the results of OLS regressions by subjects’ skills. We divided the 
                                                   
7 No subjects in the restricted sample expected their rankings to be the lowest. 
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sample into upper and lower halves based on their average rankings in a group of four 
subjects generated by 1 million times random grouping. Subjects in the lower half who 
ranked themselves fourth in their groups increased their performance, implying that we 
could improve their performance by withholding the objective information—that is, by 
not correcting overconfidence. It is noteworthy that the effect of overconfidence for the 
upper half is stronger than for the bottom half. It may imply that the effect of 
overconfidence on increased performance depends on subjects’ skill.  
 
4. Conclusion 
  This study has clarified the effect of subjective expectations and overconfidence on 
productivity by conducting experiments in which subjects solved as many mazes as 
possible in three minutes. Subjects were divided into groups of four. In Task 1, subjects 
solved mazes under a piece rate reward structure that paid ¥100 per correct answer. In 
Task 2, they solved mazes under a tournament reward structure in which only the 
winner received ¥400 per correct answer. In Task 3, subjects could choose either reward 
structure and were paid based on their choices. They were asked to anticipate their 
rankings within their groups after completing each task. 
  Previous literature reveals that performance increases under the tournament reward 
structure. Freeman and Gelber (2010), the research most relevant for this study, 
conclude that incentives contribute substantially to improving performance, and they 
investigate how performance changes by informing subjects’ about the performance of 
other group members. However, we focused on subjective expectations, which serve as 
an incentive when information about other subjects’ performance is withheld. In 
addition, Gneezy et al. (2003) report a gender difference in increased performance under 
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the tournament reward structure. We focus on the gender difference in overconfidence 
as a cause of the gender difference in higher performance, and examine the effect of 
overconfidence on productivity.  
  We found that subjective expectations and overconfidence significantly affect 
productivity. Subjects who ranked themselves lower than other group members increase 
their performance more than subjects who ranked themselves higher, and overconfident 
subjects increase their performance. This reveals the positive aspect of overconfidence, 
which previously has been examined mainly in its negative aspect as an expectation 
bias. 
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Table 1. Gender difference in performance 
 Task 1 (piece rate) Task 2 (tournament) 
  Obs. Mean S.E. Obs. Mean S.E. 
Male 67 12.209 0.291 67 13.134 0.240 
Female 64 9.719 0.280 64 11.250 0.268 
All 131 10.992 0.229 131 12.214 0.197 
Gender 
Difference 
      2.490*** 0.405      1.884*** 0.359 
Notes: *** measure significance at 1%. Because of system-related issues, one 
observation is missing. 
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Table 2. Change in performance (from Task 1 to Task 2) 
 Increase in performance Rate of increase 
  Obs. Mean S.E. Obs. Mean S.E. 
Male 67   0.925*** 0.203 67 0.094*** 0.018 
Female 64   1.531*** 0.208 64 0.185*** 0.027 
All 131   1.221*** 0.147 131 0.139*** 0.017 
Gender 
Difference 
 −0.606** 0.291  −0.091*** 0.032 
Notes: ** and *** measure significance at 5% and 1% confidence levels. Because of 
system-related issues, one observation is missing. 
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Table 3. Performance by expected rankings on Task 1 
Expected ranking  
on task 1 
Obs. 
Task 1 
(piece rate) 
Task 2 
(tournament) 
Increase in 
performance 
Rate of 
increase 
First 28 
12.714 13.321   0.607**   0.060** 
(2.386) (2.161) (1.524) (0.127) 
Second 62 
10.500 11.984    1.484***    0.167*** 
(2.455) (2.229) (1.667) (0.192) 
Third 38 
10.711 11.842    1.132***    0.130*** 
(2.535) (2.236) (1.663) (0.177) 
Fourth 3 
8.667 11.333  2.667* 0.403 
(3.055) (0.577) (2.517) (0.417) 
Notes: The table shows subjects’ performance by expected rankings on Task 1. *, **, 
and *** measure significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Because of 
system-related issues, one observation is missing. 
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Table 4. Gender differences in overconfidence 
 Overconfidence 1 Overconfidence 2 
  Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
Male 66 0.043 66 0.265** 
Female 62    0.502*** 62  0.524*** 
All 128    0.266*** 128  0.391*** 
Gender Difference -0.459*** -0.259* 
Notes: The table shows means of two overconfidence measures and gender differences 
between them. In both measures, a positive (negative) sign implies that subjects are 
overconfident (under-confident). *, **, and *** measure significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. Because of computer trouble, one observation is missing. In addition 
to it, we exclude 3 observations that belong to the same group with her because our 
method requires sample size by a factor of four when we calculate overconfidence 
measures.  
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Table 5. Gender and performance 
  Gender Obs. 
Increase in 
performance 
Rate of 
increase 
Male 
4 males 36 
   0.694***    0.071*** 
(1.527) (0.138) 
2 males and 
2 females 
26 
   0.923***    0.098*** 
(1.742) (0.160) 
Female 
4 females 32 
   1.500***    0.174*** 
(1.666) (0.185) 
2 males and 
2 females 
25 
   1.400***    0.177*** 
(1.708) (0.229) 
Notes: *** measure significance at 1%. Because of computer trouble, one observation is 
missing. 
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Table 6. Gender and overconfidence 
  Gender Obs. Overconfidence 1 Overconfidence 2 
Male 
4 male 36 
−0.027 0.226 
(0.833) (1.007) 
2 males and  
2 females 
24 
0.043 0.235 
(0.764) (0.894) 
Female 
4 female 32 
   0.606***    0.731*** 
(0.726) (0.933) 
2 males and  
2 females 
24 
  0.437**  0.371* 
(0.965) (0.981) 
Notes: The table shows means of two overconfidence measures by gender and gender. 
In both measures, a positive (negative) sign means that people are overconfident 
(under-confident). *, **, and *** measure significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. Because of system-related issues, one observation is missing. In addition to 
it, we exclude 3 observations that belong to the same group with her because our 
method requires sample size by a factor of four when we calculate overconfidence 
measures. 
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Table 7. Effects of expected rankings and overconfidence on increase in performance 
 Eq.1 Eq.2 Eq.3 Eq.4 
Constant 
   0.925***    0.992***  0.552* 0.449 
(0.203) (0.187) (0.315) (0.288) 
Female dummy 
  0.606** 0.120 0.385 −0.270 
(0.291) (0.279) (0.312) (0.300) 
Overconfidence 1 
    0.843***     0.974*** 
 (0.166)  (0.173) 
Second 
   0.715*   0.742** 
  (0.398) (0.359) 
Third 
  0.357   1.015** 
  (0.433) (0.411) 
Fourth 
   1.730*   2.447** 
  (1.037) (0.936) 
Obs. 
R2 
131 128 131 128 
0.033 0.193 0.069 0.254 
Notes: The table shows the estimation results by OLS regressions. The dependent 
variable is increase in performance from Task 1 (piece rate) to Task 2 (tournament). *, 
**, and *** measure significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Because of 
system-related issues, one observation is missing. In addition to it, in estimating Eq.2 
and Eq.4, we exclude 3 observations that belong to the same group with her because our 
method requires sample size by a factor of four when we calculate overconfidence 
measures. 
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Table 8. Effects of expected rankings and overconfidence on rate of increase in 
performance 
  Eq.1 Eq.2 Eq.3 Eq.4 
Constant 
   0.094***    0.099*** 0.051 0.030 
(0.022) (0.020) (0.034) (0.030) 
Female dummy 
   0.091*** 0.031  0.061* -0.024 
(0.032) (0.030) (0.034) (0.031) 
Overconfidence 1 
    0.112***     0.132*** 
 (0.018)  (0.018) 
Second 
   0.082*   0.091** 
  (0.044) (0.037) 
Third 
  0.043    0.136*** 
  (0.047) (0.042) 
Fourth 
    0.291**    0.392*** 
  (0.113) (0.096) 
Obs. 131 128 131 128 
R2 0.058 0.283 0.117 0.387 
Notes: The table shows the result by OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the rate 
of increase in performance from Task 1 (piece rate) to Task 2 (tournament). *, **, and 
*** measure significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Because of system-related 
issues, one observation is missing. In addition to it, in estimating Eq.2 and Eq.4, we 
exclude 3 observations that belong to the same group with her because our method 
requires sample size by a factor of four when we calculate overconfidence measures. 
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Table 9. Effects of expected rankings and overconfidence on increase in performance 
from Task 2 (tournament) to Task 3 (tournament) 
 Increase in performance Rate of increase 
  Eq.1 Eq.2 Eq.3 Eq.4 
Constant 
0.122 −0.625 0.014 −0.062 
(0.296) (0.414) (0.029) (0.041) 
Female dummy 
0.489 0.169  0.089* 0.060 
(0.536) (0.576) (0.053) (0.057) 
Overconfidence 1 
    0.802***     0.086*** 
 (0.294)  (0.029) 
Second 
   1.085**    0.113** 
 (0.512)  (0.050) 
Third 
 0.399  0.008 
 (1.026)  (0.101) 
Observations 59 57 59 57 
R2 0.014 0.178 0.047 0.236 
Notes: The table shows the result by OLS regressions. The dependent variables are 
increases in performance from Task 2 to Task 3 in Eq.1 and Eq.2 and the rate of increase 
in performance from Task 2 to Task 3 in Eq.3 and Eq.4. ** and *** measure 
significance at 5% and 1%. 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
Table 10. Effects of expected rankings and overconfidence on increase in performance 
by subjects’ maze-solving skills 
 Increase in performance Rate of increase 
  Bottom half Upper half Bottom half Upper half 
Constant 
−0.102 −0.838 −0.009 −0.073 
(1.344) (1.027) (0.169) (0.084) 
Female dummy 
  −0.971** 0.053 -0.070 0.011 
(0.426) (0.481) (0.053) (0.039) 
Overconfidence 1 
0.357    2.019***   0.097**    0.160*** 
(0.292) (0.497) (0.037) (0.041) 
Second 
 1.280*   1.038**  0.160*   0.088** 
(0.681) (0.516) (0.085) (0.042) 
Third 
1.252   1.576**  0.177*   0.126** 
(0.777) (0.679) (0.098) (0.056) 
Fourth 
   3.577***  3.211*    0.579*** 0.249 
(1.209) (1.885) (0.152) (0.155) 
Observations 64 64 64 64 
R2 0.225 0.291 0.305 0.286 
Notes: The table presents results from OLS regression. The dependent variables are the 
increase in performance and rate of increase in performance from Task 1 to Task 2. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** measure significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively. “Bottom half” (“Upper half”) refers to subjects whose 
average ranking in a group of four subjects generated by 1 million times random 
grouping is above (below) median (2.165). Because of system-related issues, one 
observation is missing. In addition to it, we exclude 3 observations that belong to the 
same group with her because our method requires sample size by a factor of four when 
we calculate overconfidence measures. 
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Figure 1. Positive correlation between overconfidence and increase in performance 
 
Notes: Figure 1 shows the arithmetic means and 95% confidence intervals of 
Overconfidence 1 by the change in performance from Task 1 to Task 2. The horizontal 
and vertical axes represent the change in performance from Task 1 to Task 2 and the 
degree of overconfidence, respectively. 
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